The transition from a hunter-gather economy to agricultural production, which made possible the endogenous technological progress that ultimately led to the industrial revolution, is one of the most important events in the thousands of years of humankind's economic development. In this paper we present theory and evidence showing that exogenous geography and initial condition biogeography exerted decisive influence on the location and timing of transitions to sedentary agriculture, to complex social organization and, eventually, to modern industrial production. Evidence from a large cross-section of countries indicates that the effects of geographic and biogeographic endowments on contemporary levels of economic development are remarkably strong.
Introduction
According to conventional wisdom in economic growth theory, geography is irrelevant for explaining relative income levels of countries. The accumulation of capital and knowledge is deemed independent of prevailing natural conditions, but instead depends on sectoral allocations of production factors, factor returns, saving rates, time discount rates and, in recent literature, political institutions. In neoclassical growth theory, history should not matter much either since well-functioning capital markets ensure that countries sooner or later converge to their steady-state levels regardless of initial conditions. The argument made in this paper is that exogenous geography and initial biogeographic endowments -and the diverging historical paths that these give rise to -in fact account for a significant part of the highly unequal distribution of productive income in the world. Favorable biogeographic initial conditions -in particular the prevalence in prehistory of plants and animals suited to domesticationled in some parts of the world to an early transition to sedentary agriculture and the rise of "civilization", which conferred on some societies a development head start of thousands of years over less fortunate areas. We argue in this paper that the impact of this head start can still be detected in the contemporary international distribution of prosperity.
Many attempts to explain long run patterns of economic development have followed Malthusian analysis in focusing on the relationship between population growth and economic development. Boserup (1981) argues that the transition from the primitive hunter-gatherer stage of development to sedentary agriculture based on domesticated plants and animals was a reaction to population pressures and climatic changes that made the hunter-gatherer lifestyle unfeasible. Kremer (1993) models technological progress from one million B.C. to the present as being endogenously determined by population growth. As support for this hypothesis, Kremer compares population size and the level of technology observed by 1500 A.D. in the Old World (Eurasia and Africa) with the situation in Australia and Tasmania. He finds, as predicted, that population size was relatively greater and the level of technology more advanced in the Old World. Population growth is also what drives historical development in the models of Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) and Galor and Weil (1998) .
Another fundamental influence on historical economic development is the institutions that societies embrace. Thanks to pioneering works such as North (1990) and Knack and Keefer (1995) , we have significant new insights about how institutions can help create diverging paths of economic progress. In a long run model of world development, Jones (1999a) follows Kremer (1993) in assuming a close relationship between population growth and technological advance.
However, per capita consumption is more or less unchanged over thousands of years until an institutional shock in the form of improved property rights propels economies toward the Industrial
Revolution and the ensuing rise in living standards. Institutions play an even greater role in Hall and Jones (1999) , where the quality of "social infrastructures" is the primes mobile of international variations in productivity and incomes.
A problem with demographic and institutional explanations of long run economic development, however, is that the factors underlying population growth and the development of good institutions are not identified. Why did population growth and institutional advance occur in some parts of the world and not in others? The models above have very little to say about this important question. Population and institutions are usually regarded as exogenously given. The main contention of this paper is that the ultimate factors in historical economic development -shaping the broad contours of population growth, and the capacity for institutional development and technological change -are geography and biogeography.
The notion that geography broadly conceived matters for societal development is not new. As early as the eighteenth century Montesquieu (1750) had advanced a theory featuring the political influence of climate. But subsequently geographic explanations of development fell into disrepute. Yet when thinking about geography and economic development, two empirical regularities inevitably stand out: First, the majority of poor countries in today's world are found in the tropical climate zone; near the equator.
Second, peoples from Eurasia (above all from the Western part) developed superior technology and colonized and dominated lands on all other continents. The first regularity has recently been observed by several authors (Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999) . Hall and Jones (1999) use a measure of absolute distance from the equator as an instrumental variable for social infrastructure.
They show that distance from the equator not only has a significant positive effect on social infrastructure, but it also exhibits a significant positive effect on output per capita.
Hall and Jones interpret this relationship as having nothing to do with geography per se;
by their thinking countries further from the equator just tend to have good institutions. Landes (1998) , Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al. (1999) take a different standpoint. Landes identifies at least three reasons why development has been relatively slow in the tropics: Heat, water supply, and disease. Severe heat typically reduces human working capacity. Water supply is problematic since it tends to be either too scarce (as in the Sahara) or too abundant (as in Amazonia) for agriculture based on annual grasses. The prevalence of serious tropical diseases like malaria, schistosomiasis, and River Blindness, poses a major obstacle to the use of animals like horses and cattle, apart from its obvious detrimental effects on human health. Bloom and Sachs (1998) point out that due to more hours of sunlight during the growing season, the photosynthetic potential for annual plants is actually greater in mid-latitude regions than in the tropics. Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al. (1999) also show that conditions for transport in Africa and other poor regions have remarkable disadvantages: A relatively small coastline, few natural ports, the highest proportion of the population within landlocked states, and the absence of rivers navigable for oceangoing vessels. Kamarck (1976) further points to the often poor quality of the soil in the tropics. Tropical soils contain little organic material.
A far more general biogeographic framework for explaining the dominance of the Western world is presented in the remarkable study of Diamond (1997) . Diamond argues that the enormous size of the Eurasian continent, its large Mediterranean zone in the western part and the East-West orientation of its major axis, meant that Eurasia was disproportionately endowed with plants suited to cultivation, animals suited to domestication, and natural corridors of transit and communication suited to the diffusion of innovations. Because of these biogeographic advantages, the agricultural revolution occurred earlier in Eurasia than anywhere else. The surplus that was generated by the superior agricultural mode of production made possible the establishment of a nonproducing class whose members were crucial for the rapid development of writing, science, cities, technology-based military prowess and states. When the continents finally collided in the late fifteenth century, the crops, horses, knowledge, institutions, weapons, and animal-based germs that had evolved in Eurasia over thousands of years overwhelmed the indigenous communities of the Americas, Africa, and Australia.
The model presented in this paper builds upon Diamond's sweeping study by proposing fundamental links between exogenous geography, initial biogeography and subsequent economic development; links so powerful that their consequences may still be detected today in international variations in output and productivity. Societies enjoying biogeographic environments with great productive potential were the first to experience an agricultural revolution making possible the development of a non-food producing sector of political and administrative elites that produced and organized knowledge. After the transition from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture, economies enter a path of endogenous technological progress and increased population growth. Per capita output, however, does not start growing until the Industrial Revolution when the Malthusian link between rising output and population is broken.
The central hypothesis we investigate quantitatively is that present levels of per capita income still register the effects of exogenous geographic conditions and initial biogeographic endowments. This hypothesis receives remarkably strong empirical support from data for a broad cross-section of countries.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section two reviews modern archeological evidence on the emergence of horticulture and and animal husbandry ("sedentary agriculture"). Section three develops a stylized theoretical framework showing how exogenous geographic conditions and initial biogeographic endowments affected the timing of transitions thousands of years ago from hunter-gatherer to agricultural production, thereby unleashing sustained technological progress that eventually led to the Industrial Revolution. Section four supplies empirical evidence on the model's principal implications regarding the importance of geography and biogeography to economic development. Section five concludes by summarizing the theory and evidence featured in our research.
The Agricultural Revolution

1
Around 11,000 B.C. humankind was on the verge of entering an era of yet to be surpassed economic development. The retreat of the great glaciers that marked the end of the Pleistocene geological epoch and the beginning of the Holocene, brought a warmer and wetter climate and a reoccupation of the ecological vacuum that the ices had 1 Section two below relies, except where noted, on Diamond (1997) and Smith (1998 In what is probably the most comprehensive survey of modern research on the subject, Smith (1998) identifies a number of factors that the independent transitions to agriculture in the Levant, in the Southern Sahara and in the Eastern United States had in common. First, in all three regions, the species brought under domestication were seed plants rather than root crops or animals. Second, in all three regions, the wild ancestors of these domesticates appear to have been important food sources before their domestication. Third, the people who domesticated these seed plants lived in relatively large, permanent communities occupied throughout most, if not all, of the year. Fourth, these societies were relatively affluent, having access to a broad spectrum of wild plants and animals in their diets, as well as to the resources of rich aquatic habitats. Fifth, since these early agricultural settlements were located near lakes or rivers, they also had access to a reliable supply of groundwater. Sixth, it appears that the agricultural communities were bounded in time and space by less secure environments. Preceding the emergence of agriculture in all three regions were climatic changes that worsened the conditions for the hunter-gatherer way of living in the areas surrounding the richer environments near lakes and rivers.
It is important to stress, however, that the emergence of food production was far from a deliberate revolution in human lifestyle. Diamond (1997) A key issue is whether the agricultural revolution took place out of necessity or because of opportunity. In the language of the economics of innovation, was the emergence of agriculture a result of "demand-pull" or "supply-push"? Advocates of the former view usually argue that an exogenous increase in population forced huntergatherers to adopt a more efficient mode of production which did not necessarily increase average standards of living (Boserup, 1981) . Climatic changes at the end of the Pleistocene might also have reduced the availability of wild game, thereby making the domestication of animals more or less necessary. Jacobs (1969) California, and Northern Australia -but none of these were nearly as big as the Eurasian zone. Although wet tropical habitats typically show an enormous biological diversity, their lack of seasonal changes, the irregularity of water supply, the relatively poor quality of soils, and the prevalence of diseases and pests harmful to humans, animals and crops, make agriculture complicated (Kamarck, 1976) . (Blumler, 1992) . The figures do not add to 56 because some species are found in more than one continent. c The numbers refer to the geographical distribution of the world's 14 domesticable herbivorous or omnivorous, terrestrial mammals weighing more than 45 kilos (Nowak, 1991; Diamond, 1997) . Sources: Nowak (1991) , Blumler (1992) , and Diamond (1997) .
A third important reason, emphasized by Diamond (1997) , is the East-West orientation of Eurasia's major axis. An East-West axis orientation facilitates diffusion of plants and animals. There are a number of reasons for this: Along the same latitude, regions will typically have the same day length, the same seasonal variations, the same regimes of temperature and rainfall, and even the same diseases. Imported domesticated species can easily adapt to such similar environments even though their wild ancestors live elsewhere. All other continents have North-South as the main axis of orientation, and this hampered the diffusion of agricultural innovations.
A picture thus emerges of opportunity rather than need as being the prime causal factor that tipped development in favor of agriculture in certain areas. The advantages would soon become obvious; domesticated plants gave a reliable source of food with high nutritional value which could feed a much greater population per unit area than hunting-gathering. Domesticated animals gave meat, milk, fertilization, wool, leather, and were subsequently used for transport, plowing, and warfare. The close physical proximity of man and animal also eventually gave agriculturists a high resistance to animal related germs such as those causing smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis. All these advantages gradually made organized food production the dominant way of living in all of Eurasia where expanding agricultural communities swept away most of the remaining hunter-gatherers.
The path to civilization was now inevitable. In densely populated towns and cities, a nonproducing class emerged which was able to dominate the rest of the population by gaining control of the agricultural surplus. Among these classes of chiefs, priests, warriors, bureaucrats, and skilled craftsmen, an explosion of new knowledge occurred in astronomy, mathematics, geometry, construction, and social organization. Writing, probably the most important innovation of all times, first appeared in Sumer around 4000 B.C. Great empires soon emerged; Akkad, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, and the most advanced of them all, the Greek and Roman civilizations, which today still serve as the pillars of Western civilization. Meanwhile, in less well-endowed areas like Sub-Saharan Africa and Australia -areas with hardly any domesticable speciesdevelopment was much slower. Agriculture was eventually adopted in Sub-Saharan Africa through the expansion of the Bantu peoples, but when the Europeans finally arrived in Australia, they found an Aboriginal population that was still at the huntergatherer stage of development. Judging from the data in Table 2 and from the argument developed above, this was not at all surprising.
A Theoretical Framework
We now present a simple theoretical framework of economic development over the three major stages of history; the hunter-gatherer stage, the agricultural stage, and the industrial stage. The aim is to provide a formal representation of the link between initial geographic and biogeographic conditions and the present level of economic well-being.
In so doing, we will make use of four stylized facts that were derived in the previous section: (1) Agriculture was first developed in relatively rich environments. (2) There were no differences across continents in hunter-gatherers' inherent ability to exploit their natural environments. (3) The agricultural revolution made possible the emergence of a class of chiefs, craftsmen, and bureaucrats that lived on the surplus from the food producing sector. (4) The introduction of a non-food sector initiated a process of endogenous knowledge creation and an increase in population growth. In addition to these four stylized facts, we introduce a fifth, derived from the empirical literature on long run growth: (5) Standards of living did not significantly increase until the Industrial Revolution (Maddison, 1982; Fogel, 1999; Johnson, 2000) .
Initial Biogeographic Endowments
As discussed in the previous section, the date 11,000 B.C. appears to be a good starting point for an analysis of the transition from primitive to modern production. All major continents had been populated and technologies for collecting, processing and storing food were widely known (Diamond, 1997) . Let us assume that by this time there
are N variations of geographic conditions and biogeographic endowments in those parts of the world that were settled by human beings. Such environments would include tropical rainforests, arctic tundra, lowland deserts, Mediterranean grasslands, and so on.
For simplicity, we imagine that all environments are constant from this time forward. 3 It is well known that environmental conditions have not been constant during the Holocene geological epoch. The tremendous increase in rainfall during the early Holocene, which for instance made possible permanent hunter-gatherer presence in the Sahara and in the now arid parts of Israel, eventually reached a peak and was followed by cooler and drier periods. Although such changing conditions surely affected human life, they did not change the fundamental character of the environment in relation to other regions; even if the Sahara temporarily had higher precipitation, it was still a tropical dry region in the north of the African continent which lacked suitable species for domestication.
A crucial assumption in the model below is that the initial conditions for environment n, Ã n , are different from the initial conditions of all other environments, that is, Ã n ≠Ã n+1 for all n={1,2,…N}. This means that a ranking of the productive potentials is possible. The quality of Ã n in turn is exogenously determined by geographic conditions. Climate is an important factor in this regard. For various reasons, the biogeographic productive potential of Mediterranean habitats is greater than that of, for instance, arctic regions. In fact, as we pointed out in the previous section, the agricultural potential of the Mediterranean climate zone in Eurasia appears to be superior to all others. The size of the continent also influences Ã n , as does the orientation of its major axis.
The Hunter-Gatherer Economy
There are three fundamental stages of economic development: The hunter-gatherer economy, sedentary agriculture, and modern industrial production. 4 During the greater part of human history, hunting and gathering predominated. In the beginning, all human beings across all environments were hunter-gatherers. At some point in time
A n tT ∈ -where 0 is the starting point of our analysis at approximately 11,000 B.C. and T =13,000 is the present day -the n-th economy makes the switch to full scale agriculture.
However, in between these two "pure" stages is a transition period
in which both hunting-gathering and primitive agriculture is practiced.
Output per capita in the pure hunter-gatherer stage is simply at a subsistence level y that is invariant across environments and time during hundreds of thousands of years in the prehistoric time span τ∈(-¥,0 Over time we assume that A n (τ) grows according to a stochastic process
. Growth in productive knowledge is random because no resources are devoted to experimental research activities. The discovery of production methods is therefore to a large extent a matter of luck or pure chance. However, the expected growth rate of productive knowledge is
where ƒ´(Ã n ) = γ>0 is a parameter reflecting people's propensity to learn from nature.
Equation (2) implies that the greater the biogeographic productive potential of n, the greater its expected growth rate of productive knowledge. Note also the central assumption that γ is constant across all n. In line with the stylized facts discussed above, this means that there are no differences between societies in their inherent ability to learn about and exploit their environments. Differences in the growth of productive knowledge derive solely from differences in initial conditions Ã n , that is, there are simply more useful things to learn from a richer environment.
It is often argued in a Malthusian manner that there is a link between the growth of productive knowledge and population. There are at least three reasons for such an assumption. First, more people means more potential innovators of nonrivalrous ideas.
Second, during times of increasing population density, there will be an increasing demand for new technology to cope with population pressure. Third, an increase in productive knowledge creates production surpluses that allow an increased level of population. Kremer (1993) models the growth of knowledge as a function of population size on the grounds of the first argument. Boserup (1981) claims that population pressure is the main determinant of the switch to agricultural technology, in line with the second argument. However, as was discussed above, modern archeological research, influenced by Smith (1998) , has de-emphasized the importance of population pressure as a direct influence on the transition to agricultural production.
The fundamental assumption in our model is rather that knowledge growth before the appearance of sedentary agriculture is opportunity-driven; it is a function of the productive potential of the environment. We further believe that technological advance temporarily results in rising living standards, which in turn allow population increases.
Seen over the whole transition period to full-scale agriculture, we will therefore have that The variance of the growth rate is likely to be substantial, however, yielding famine and threats of extinction in some periods and relative prosperity in others. If we make the simplifying assumption that in the long run
A (0), the number of domesticated plants and animals at the beginning of the transition period, is equal across all n and is here normalized to be A(0)=1. (Diamond, 1997; Smith, 1998 
In (4) κ is a positive constant that is identical across environments; 
The Agricultural Economy
The greater efficiency of agricultural food production had major implications for the n-th economy. It allowed resources to be transferred to a separate knowledge producing sector, which in turn led to an increase in the growth rate of new knowledge. Although this process initially created surpluses and rising living standards, Malthusian forces soon led to a proportional increase in population which neutralized technological advance and kept per capita income levels at subsistence level. 10 A more predictable supply of food with a higher nutritional value, in combination with the reduced need of continual migration, also contributed to increased fertility and reduced mortality.
The establishment of a non-food sector in settled communities, whose members lived on the agricultural surplus, was nonetheless one of the most fundamental societal changes in human history. In this sector were the kings, the warriors, the bureaucrats, the priests, and the specialized craftsmen. Their activities ("output") were a prerequisite for the gradual evolution of civilization. 11 These elites coordinated labor and allocated resources. In so doing they also invented written language, mathematics, science, law and institutions for social control and governance. New knowledge was created more The production function for the food and capital producing sector is shown in (5).
Output per capita at time δ>δ> is an exogenous 10 The archeological record suggests that standards of living were roughly the same in early agricultural societies and in hunter-gatherer communities; see, for example, the monograph of Boserup (1981) and the review of Johnson (2000) . 11 One might of course argue that the emergence of specialized elites and ruling classes was a mixed blessing. The agricultural revolution inevitably led to social stratification and the invention of slavery, and it made possible centralized tyrannical rule. 12 Landes (1998) argues that the Jewish-Christian tradition of nature's subordination to man explains the rise of norms among Western peoples that promoted efficient exploitation of natural resources and related impulses to economic progress. It appears to be no coincidence that this tradition had its roots in the Fertile Crescent. 13 Y=f (A,x,vL) . Dividing this function for total output by L yields (5).
productivity parameter, reflecting the higher productivity in the full scale agricultural economy.
( ) might also be the case that A n (τ) > Ã n . The establishment of a nonproducing sector made it possible for the people in n to learn about and create capital goods beyond the limit set by n's initial environmental conditions. Apart from sheep, cows and wheat, the farming communities now invest in town walls, irrigation systems, and public storehouses. In a hunter-gatherer society, such capital goods are useless, but in a relatively densely populated farming community, inventions like these are vital. Embodied in each of such capital goods is a human idea or piece of knowledge. A n might thus be seen as reflecting the general state of technological knowledge in society. Knowledge growth is described by the following function:
The rate of knowledge growth is therefore ( )
nonrivalrous production factor, it can be used both in the regular sector and for the creation of new knowledge. Growth of knowledge in n has two sources; endogenous creation in n and diffusion from other environments. Endogenous knowledge production is captured by the first term inside the parenthesis, where ( )
share of the labor force in the non-food sector. The growth rate of knowledge thus increases linearly with ( )
, but there is no "scale effect" in (6) since the growth rate does not increase with the level of the population.
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D n is the diffusion of knowledge from other continents. 16 Such diffusion could arguably be modeled as a function of several factors; for instance geography and the knowledge gap between n and the rest of the world (Olsson, 1999 Output per capita in the industrial era is given by the production function
Equation (7) is meant to describe both agricultural and industrial production. This new structure of production differs from agricultural production in (5) in several respects:
Productivity is higher ( 
The partly endogenous, partly exogenous knowledge formation from the agricultural era is thus continued, with the important difference that ( ) ( ) 20 The reason for this empirical regularity has been widely discussed.
Galor and Weil (1998) argue that improved technology increased the returns to human capital, which made parents switch from child "quantity" to child "quality". We believe this may be an important reason, although we do not explicitly model it. The implication of the termination of the Malthusian link is that / 
Comparative Statics
The solution to the differential equation in (6) yields the level of productive knowledge at the time of the Industrial Revolution, that is at time
Equation (9) The important insight from this result is that, all else equal, the later the transition to agricultural production, the later the transition to an industrial economy.
Next, since we have already established that income per capita did not start growing until the start of the Industrial Revolution, we can express the present level of log income at T τ= as yT and Ã n . is concave.
Some Empirical Evidence
The principal prediction of the theoretical exercises in section three is that the contemporary level of economic development should be positively related to initial biogeographic endowments, that is, to biogeographies favoring an early transition to agriculture. Calibration of initial conditions, Ã n , is necessarily imprecise. However, there are a number of plausible proxies. In line with Diamond (1997) and the reasoning above, we obtain measurements of five key geographic and biogeographic variables:
size of continent, major axis of continent, climate (calibrated in two ways), and the number of animal and plant candidates for domestication.
The sequence of relationships is depicted in Figure 1 . All else equal, the larger the size of a continent or landmass, the greater the biodiversity and the greater the number of species suitable for domestication. The greater the East-West orientation of the major axis, the easier was the diffusion of agricultural innovations between areas. A temperate climate, and in particular the Mediterranean subtype, favors annual grasses like wheat and barley. Geography (inclusive of climate) affects the number of plant and animal species suited to domestication, which in turn determined the timing of the agricultural revolution and the subsequent evolution of endogenously created knowledge, the formation of modern sociopolitical institutions and the onset of sustained growth. The metrics of some of our variables have no natural or intuitive interpretation.
Hence to facilitate assessments of relative effects we convert all variables, except output per capita, to 'standard' form, which yields variates with mean zero and unit variance. 
Regressions
Tables 5 and 6 report evidence from regressions. The regression setups are far from perfect representations of the equations presented in section three, which themselves are merely stylized mechanisms designed to aid thinking about the connections of geography and biogeography to contemporary levels of economic development.
Regressions 1 to 4 in Table 5 pertain to the first link of the long-run causal scheme featured in our historical analysis and illustrated by Tt − , and it shows some sign of the concavity implied by equation (4). Table 6 reports regressions for log 1997 GDP per capita, the end-point of the long causal sequence depicted in Figure Diamond (1997) and Smith (1998) . The 8 regions include the six independent origins of agriculture in Table 1 , plus Australia and the Pacific where agriculture was never independently developed. 26 It should be noted that the first attested dates of domestication used in the regression, do not fully correspond to the transition dates to full scale agriculture ( A n t ) discussed in the theoretical section. However, the dates that we use in this section are undoubtedly closely connected in time to the true transition dates. Archeological evidence suggests that once one animal or plant was domesticated, the others soon followed. independent variations of prehistorical Bio Conditions (Plants and Animals) in the 112 country sample (cf. Table 2), we take this to be a quite remarkable result.
Yet the evidence in regressions 1 to 4 in Table 6 should not be over interpreted. For example, taken at face value the estimates for regression 3 imply that a change from the worst Bio and Geo Conditions to the best would yield a shift in 1997 GDP per capita from around 1000 dollars to around 8600 dollars.
27 Given measurement imprecision, exogenous geography and initial condition biogeography therefore are able to account for at least eight and one-half of the nearly sixty-fold difference in contemporary incomes per head which is observed in a broad international cross-section of countries.
This corresponds to the development gaps between, for instance, Ghana, Nigeria or Zimbabwe (where incomes are in the vicinity of 1000 dollars of income per head) and Greece, Malaysia or Portugal (where incomes lie in the interval 7,300 to 8,700 dollars per head).
The full range of international variation in incomes per person, however, runs from the 400 to 500 dollars per person typical of the poorest countries to the 15,000 to 20,000 dollars per person enjoyed by the richest. Hence, a complete accounting of contemporary variations in economic prosperity requires explanatory variables generating predictions that halve the per capita incomes implied by the worst geography and biogeography, and that double the per capita incomes implied by best. The leading candidates are the political and institutional arrangements that constrain, and at times influence decisively, the effectiveness of economic activity.
27 These estimates are computed simply by applying the coefficients in regression 3, Table 6 (along with the omitted constant) to the range of variation (reported in Table 3 ) of Geo and Bio Conditions, and then finding the implied levels of GDP per capita from the predicted log values. In regressions 4 and 5 of Table 6 the Political Environment variable introduced earlier is added to equations including Geo Conditions and Bio Conditions. Regressions 6 and 7 are specified with the Social Infrastructure variable that was discussed earlier.
Estimates for these models reinforce results reported in earlier papers by Acemoglu et al. (2000) , Gallup et al. (1999) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Knack and Keefer (1995) , Olson et al. (2000) and Rodrik (1997) The same is not true, however, of the political-institutional variables; among other reasons because rich countries have the resources to build institutions of high quality.
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Researchers have struggled with the joint endogeneity issue, proposing various instrumental variables to obtain consistent estimates of the proximate effects of politics and institutions on economic performance. None of these attempts is entirely persuasive 28 The related idea that a relatively high level of economic development (and perhaps also distributions of wealth and income that are not too inequitable) are prerequistes for democractic political development (conceived in terms of competitive politics, the rule of law, security of property rights and individual liberties, and so forth) can be traced in the modern social science literature back at least to Lipset (1959) , and before that back to the Aristotle and other ancient thinkers. Lipset (1981, chapter 14) 
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These regressions notwithstanding, we believe along with many others that the political-institutional environment has powerful and genuinely independent causal effect on economic growth and development. Yet because of difficult-to-resolve identification problems, just how big an influence politics and institutions exert on economic performance has not been (and may never be) pinned down with great precision. 29 As an illustration, take the Hall and Jones (1999) study which uses latitude, the fraction of the population speaking English and the fraction speaking another European language as instruments for Social Infrastructure. However, a high incidence of English and other European languages in current periods is strongly associated with non-extractive colonization (what Acemoglu et al., 2000 , call the creation of "neo Europes"), which meant the wholesale transference of an advanced food and technological package from the most advanced societies to the new worlds that most likely still affects development. Latitude is even more difficult to defend as a valid instrument. The unstable rainfall, poor soil quality and prevalence of disease associated with the lower latitudes almost surely depresses economic development directly.
Concluding Summary
Archeological and related evidence strongly suggests that the timing and location of transitions from hunting and gathering to horticulture and animal husbandry were decisively affected by biogeographic endowments of various regions of the world in prehistory. This historical observation is a key feature of our stylized model of economic growth and development. In our model biogeographic productive potentials drive transitions to sedentary agriculture, which in turn make possible the formation of non-food sectors of knowledge producers whose activities fuel endogenous technological progress and sustained positive growth. The model implies that the earlier the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural production, the longer the period of endogenous growth of knowledge, the longer the period of positive steady state growth of output, and the higher the level of economic development -even in the present day.
The main implications of our reading of history and of our theoretical setup received quite strong support in the data. Consistent with the long-run causal scheme depicted in Figure 1 , we found that measures of exogenous geographic conditions explain more than three-quarters of the regional variation in prehistoric biogeography.
As implied by our theoretical model, these admittedly rough measurements of biogeography are positively (and perhaps concavely) related to our equally rough assessments of the transition dates to sedentary agriculture; our Bio Conditions variable accounts for around two-thirds of the regional variation in the estimated dates of transition.
Our empirical analyses, however, focused principally on contemporary levels of economic development. Our regressions showed that as much as half of the 1997 international variation in log output per person can be explained by our noisy measures of exogenous geography and prehistoric biogeography. We interpreted this regression evidence to give remarkably strong support to a central prediction of our theoretical model and the associated historical analysis: Current variations in economic prosperity still embody the effects of the prehistoric productive potentials of various environments. Moreover, the geographic and biogeographic signals we detected in current levels of income per person were robust to controls for political and institutional variables that are known to exert powerful, proximate statistical influence on international variations in economic prosperity.
Data Appendix
Definitions and Sources of Variables
Climate is constructed on the basis of Köppen's widely used system of climatic Blumler (1992) and Diamond (1997) , this type of climate is particularly favorable to agriculture based on annual, heavy grasses. Countries that fall into this category were scored 3. Hence, Climate has four units of variation with a mean value normalized to 0.
Latitude is the absolute distance from the equator in latitude degrees. The data are from World Bank (1999) .
Axis captures the rate of East-West orientation. The variable was constructed by measuring the distance in longitudinal degrees between the eastern and westernmost points of each continent and dividing this number by the distance in latitudinal degrees between the northernmost and southernmost points. A value of, for instance, 2 indicates that the landmass in question is about two times more East-West oriented than northsouth. The Eurasian landmass is by far the most East-West oriented of the major continents, while South America is the most north-south oriented. 30 The data and the discussion of climate have been derived from Britannica (2000) .
Size is just the size of the landmass to which the country belongs in millions of square kilometers. The variation is enormous ranging from Eurasia's 44 million square kilometers to the tiny Malta and Comoros islands of less than 1000 square kilometers.
Geo Conditions is the first principal component of Climate, Latitude, Axis, and Size.
Plants is the number of annual or perennial wild grasses known to exist in prehistory with a mean kernel weight exceeding 10 milligrams. These data are from Blumler (1992) and are equivalent to the numbers shown and discussed in Table 2 . The geographical distribution ranges between 33 species in the Near East, Europe, and North Africa -including wild barley, emmer and einkorn wheat -to 0 in the Pacific islands.
As noted above, we have divided Eurasia into three subcontinents which had different and independent experiences of plant and animal domestication. The Western part reaches its limit in the Indus Valley in Pakistan, where the easternmost archeological evidence of crops from the Fertile Crescent has been found (Smith, 1998) . Southeast
Asia includes Indonesia, the Philippines, and Papua-New Guinea. Also America is split up into three zones of independent agricultural origins; Central, North, and South.
Caribbean islands and islands near Africa are regarded as belonging to the Central American and African zones respectively, while the Pacific islands are treated as independent of the Asian zone of agricultural origin (and hence have zero species suitable for domestication).
Animals is the number of domesticable big mammals, weighing more than 45 kilos, which are believed to have been present in prehistory in various regions. The data were presented in Table 2 . The 14 animals are the ancient ancestors of sheep, goat, cattle, horse, pig, Bakhtrian camel, Arabian camel, llama, yak, bali cattle, reindeer, water buffalo, donkey, and the mithan (Diamond, 1997) . Out of these 14, western Eurasia and North Africa had access to 9, Eastern Eurasia 7, Southeast Asia 2, Central and North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia and the Pacific islands 0 (Nowak, 1991 Easterly on the basis of Penn World Table 5 .6 and other sources.
Years since transition to agriculture is the number of years before the present that agriculture was adopted in eight world areas of independent agricultural development.
The only missing region is Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Papua-New Guinea)
where transition data are very uncertain. The data builds upon Diamond (1997) and were partly presented in Table 1 . 
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